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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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8 AUG 1973


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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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
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8 AUGUST 1973

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

MAJOR PRAVDA ARTICLE STRESSES COORDINATION, ATTACKS PEKING

Moscow has followed up the Crimea meeting of communist leaders with an authoritative expression of its concern over communist unity and the challenge posed by Chinese hostility. Using the vehicle of a lengthy PRAVDA article on 7 August bearing the signature of "I. Aleksandrov," an apparent pseudonym that has been associated with major policy pronouncements on the China problem,* Moscow has conveyed a strong interest in broader policy coordination by communist regimes in pressing the detente line worldwide. The Aleksandrov article provides a wide-ranging amplification of themes advanced in a 3 August CPSU Politburo communique on the Crimea conference that had asserted Moscow's positions on communist unity and international detente in stronger terms than did the bland joint communique issued at the conference.**

The Aleksandrov article's invocations of the 1969 international party conference and its two predecessors may presage a campaign to convene another such conference. The Politburo communique contained a possible hint of interest in a new conference by citing a need for "a collective analysis" of current issues.

CHINA The overriding, almost obsessive theme in the Aleksandrov article is the need for unity in "the socialist community" in all fields, including foreign policy coordination, economic integration, and above all in confronting the Chinese challenge with closed ranks. The article plays up the successes in implementing the Soviet detente policy, highlighting in particular the Soviet-U.S. agreement on preventing nuclear war, and it cites the Crimea meeting as confirming a determination to expand the area of detente worldwide. But a sharply discordant note appears when the article takes up the China question, a subject that generates a heated denunciation of the Peking leadership for having made a "full" break with Marxism-Leninism and a "complete" departure from the common line of the socialist countries.

* The last previous I. Aleksandrov article, on 5 September 1972, mounted a broad attack on Peking's domestic and foreign policies; it also made a passing reference to the 1972 Crimea conference, held more than a month earlier, but there was no authoritative commentary on that conclave as such.

** The joint communique is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 August 1973, pages 9-10.

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The article acknowledges that relations with Peking are "tense," due of course to the "fault of the Chinese leadership," and it observes that this situation is "a downright anachronism" in an era of detente. But though it affirms Moscow's readiness for "constructive" negotiations with the Chinese, the article in effect quashes any hope for progress by making this contingent on Peking's cessation of its "hostile activity." There would scarcely be any need for negotiations if Peking were to accede to this demand.

The article repeats Moscow's claim that it has often offered "constructive proposals"---left unspecified this time---but that the Chinese have rejected them or left them unanswered. It also cites the CPSU plenum this April as having reconfirmed Moscow's desire for normal relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. The plenum resolution had not, however, cited peaceful coexistence as the basis for Sino-Soviet relations, and in fact the Soviets had long regarded this as an inappropriate basis for relations between communist states. In his major address on 20 March 1972, during the period between the two big summits that year, Brezhnev had expressed---with an air of resignation---a readiness to accede to Peking's demand that Sino-Soviet relations be based on peaceful coexistence. The Chinese are evidently regarded as so far beyond the pale that Moscow's position on this matter now smacks more of excommunication than of an ideological concession.

The Aleksandrov article, which is markedly more hostile to the Chinese than Brezhnev had been in March 1972, comes soon after the return from Peking of Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev, the chief Soviet negotiator at the border talks.* Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov has also been absent from Peking. In contrast, Brezhnev's more conciliatory speech in March last year coincided with Ilichev's return to Peking after a prolonged absence.

NEUTRALITY The Aleksandrov article is at pains to portray the China problem as one that confronts the communist countries as a whole. In fact, the article takes explicit exception to the view that the conflict concerns national differences between the Soviet Union and the PRC. It insists rather that "the Maoist leadership" is waging a struggle against the very principles of Marxism-Leninism and the program "collectively" elaborated at the international party conferences of 1957, 1960, and 1969.

* See the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 13-14.

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Moscow's insistence on this point is implicitly directed at the Romanians and others who take a neutralist stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute and argue that differences between communist countries should be settled by bilateral talks. Romania's adherence to its line undoubtedly accounted for the blandness of the Crimean conference joint communique and the absence of criticism of China. Moscow's pique over the Romanian position was clearly reflected in Soviet reports of Brezhnev's individual meetings with various communist leaders following the Crimea meeting. Only the report of the Brezhnev-Ceausescu meeting, published in PRAVDA on the 2d, failed to mention an "identity of views on all questions discussed." Moreover, except for the meeting with Ceausescu, all the reports of Brezhnev's meetings with individual leaders referred to discussion of "further" development of bilateral relations and to a "cordial and friendly" atmosphere. The atmosphere of the Brezhnev-Ceausescu meeting was merely described as "friendly."

POLITBURO COMMUNIQUE The Aleksandrov article's insistent demands for broader policy coordination and its criticism of China were foreshadowed in the CPSU Politburo communique on the Crimea meeting published in PRAVDA on the 4th. The Politburo communique spelled out Moscow's positions on international detente and communist unity in stronger terms than did the joint communique issued at the close of the Crimea conference. Where the latter had warned vaguely against unidentified "forces" opposed to detente, the Politburo communique spoke, in the language of the April CPSU plenum, of "intrigues of reactionary forces." It likewise went beyond the text of the joint communique in urging communist regimes to coordinate their policies "permanently" and in stressing the need for a "collective analysis" of current theoretical and political problems. By the same token, without attacking China by name the Politburo communique criticized "'left' and right-wing opportunist trends" in world communism.

BUCHAREST REAFFIRMS INDEPENDENCE AFTER CRIMEA CONCLAVE

Romanian reaction to the Crimea conference reflected Bucharest's determination to persist in its independent course while downplaying its differences with Moscow. Bucharest radio on the 3d, for example, reported that a Romanian Communist Party (RCP) Executive Committee meeting that day, after hearing Ceausescu's report, had called the Crimea meeting "a useful exchange of opinions on some problems" involving socialist countries and "some current international

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problems" as well. Unlike the Crimea joint communique, which had lavished praise on Brezhnev, the Bucharest session reserved its enthusiasm for Ceausescu's personal role in the Crimea which was said to have strengthened the unity of the socialist countries and "increased the prestige of socialism in the world." After praising the meeting between Ceausescu and Brezhnev, the Executive Committee reportedly "decided that firm action should be taken to implement the agreements" reached between the two leaders. TASS reported these details of the RCP session the next day.

A commentary carried by AGERPRES on the 4th was more outspoken in reasserting Romania's independent stance. While applauding the results of the Crimea meeting and the Ceausescu-Brezhnev talks, the commentary appeared to respond to the contentious emphasis on policy "coordination" in the CPSU Politburo communique by declaring:

As is well known, Romania, in full accordance with the guidelines of her foreign policy established by the 10th congress [1969] and the national conference [1972], shows permanent concern for the development of relations of cooperation and friendship with all socialist countries.

The commentary went on to point out that Bucharest cooperates with the CEMA member countries on the basis of "fully equal rights" and national sovereignty--principles which, it noted, are incorporated in the CEMA statute.

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EUROPE

MOSCOW REBUTS CHARGES U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR ACCORD HARMS EUROPE

Paralleling the major effort it has launched since the June summit to justify the ideological legitimacy of its detente policies, Moscow has mounted a similar campaign in recent weeks to justify its policies to the West European audience. No less than six major commentaries authored by some of Moscow's most authoritative spokesmen have been devoted at least in part to this campaign over the past two weeks.* The commentaries have focused on rebutting alleged West European concerns that the U.S.-Soviet agreement on prevention of nuclear war threatens the security of West Europe.

The arguments have ranged from a general defense of the nuclear agreement to specific rebuttals of Western arguments. They have tended to present the issue as involving two conflicting views of European security--one based on a perpetuation of the old confrontation politics, the other based on trust and mutual accommodation. A notable feature of the campaign is that it has put Moscow in the position of seeming to defend U.S. policy as well as its own. At the same time--and perhaps to counterbalance this impression--the commentaries have stressed the independence of the West European countries, suggesting Moscow's willingness to treat them as equals.

At the most general level, Moscow has simply denied the Western charges that the nuclear agreement implies superpower condominium of Europe. In so doing, it has sought to pin the responsibility for such charges on those who base their policy on "perpetuating abnormal" relations between Washington and Moscow. This assertion was most recently made by IZVESTIYA political commentator Matveyev on 7 August. Another commentator, USA Institute military strategist Trofimenko, writing in the 24 July RED STAR, bluntly labeled the "assertions of certain organs of the Western, and not only the Western, press" that the nuclear agreement signified the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet "nuclear condominium" as "absurd and provocative."

* This list of press articles includes the following: TASS director general Zamyatin in SOVIET RUSSIA on 21 July, Colonel Leontyev in RED STAR on the 21st, USA Institute director Arbatov in PRAVDA on the 22d, USA Institute military strategist Trofimenko in RED STAR on the 24th, political observer A. Bovin in IZVESTIYA on the 25th, and political observer Matveyev in IZVESTIYA on 7 August.

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He went on to assert that this interpretation of the agreement was made by those who preferred U.S.-Soviet relations to be in a state of tension and who "cherished the idea that some small conflict or other, provoked 'at the right time,' might be a 'trigger' to bring the strategic forces of the United States and the USSR into conflict." A similar argument was made by TASS director general Zamyatin in SOVIET RUSSIA on 21 July.

An article by IZVESTIYA political observer Bovin* on 25 July broadened this argument into an attack on the fundamental premises of NATO policy. Without mentioning the agreement specifically, Bovin pointed out that the allies of the United States "are worried" over the possibility that Washington may lessen its commitments to West Europe, thus undermining the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" which protects the alliance from an alleged "Soviet threat." Bovin went on to note that some "medium and small" states are "mesmerizing themselves with apparitions" of a U.S.-Soviet hegemony which reduces other countries to the "level of obedient players executing the will of the 'nuclear giants.'" Asserting that relations between NATO allies are an "internal matter" the nature of which is "not determined in Moscow," he went on to lecture his audience about the responsibility of NATO members to resolve their own alliance problems. Asserting that Moscow's concern was with the "aggressive" sum of NATO, not with its individual parts, Bovin declared that the USSR supports good bilateral relations between the NATO members as long as they do not "harm" the interests of other states, adding that this position "does not depend on the state" of Moscow-Washington relations. He concluded by rejecting charges that the USSR plans to "absorb" West Europe, labeling such charges as "totally without foundation."

That one of the targets of this Moscow propaganda effort is Paris was reflected in the Brezhnev Kiev speech on 26 July--the day before the Soviet leader met with French Foreign Minister Jobert in the Crimea--and in the followup comment on that speech. Brezhnev decried as "totally without foundation, unnecessary, and even harmful" those who were trying to "counterpose a great or even supergreat state to a medium-sized or small one." A commentator

* Since his first appearance in June 1972 as a political observer for IZVESTIYA, Bovin has written but a dozen articles; his commentaries have usually been of a serious nature, discussing the most topical and sensitive international issues.

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on the Moscow radio international observers roundtable on 5 August clearly put the Brezhnev remark into the context of Soviet-French relations in denouncing allegations that the USSR and the United States were making "a deal behind the backs and at the expense of other states."

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U S S R

BREZHNEV HINTS AT DOMESTIC DIVIDENDS AS A RESULT OF DETENTE

Brezhnev in his 26 July speech in Kiev went as far as any Soviet leader has to date in implying that Moscow hopes to extract immediate peace dividends from detente in the form of increased attention to domestic priorities. Noting that the international atmosphere had become "noticeably warmer," Brezhnev declared that "it is easier to concentrate on the solution of peaceful, constructive tasks and on affairs really worthy of man." While Brezhnev may have had both domestic and international tasks in mind, it is notable that both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA picked up his Kiev remarks as the keynote of their 31 July reports on the opening of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session devoted to the improvement of consumer services. PRAVDA quoted Brezhnev verbatim, while IZVESTIYA quoted another portion of his remarks which struck the same theme. RED STAR, perhaps sensitive to the budgetary implications, did not mention Brezhnev's remarks in a report of the session that was otherwise similar to PRAVDA's.

A "NEW LOOK" Moscow has been unusually forthcoming since the Washington summit in discussing the possible peace dividends to be expected from the normalization of relations with the United States. Brezhnev himself in his 11 July Lenin peace prize acceptance speech spoke of the need "to look anew" at certain questions of policy and to "define new goals" in view of the favorable international situation. Presumably with an eye toward the budgetary implications of these suggestions, Brezhnev at one point in the speech appeared to be rejecting the notion that Soviet military might constitutes the best guarantee of the stability of detente. Acknowledging that the USSR must guard against being "caught unawares" by attempts to reverse the trend toward detente, he asserted that "the best defense of peace is further active pursuit of our peaceful policy." USA Institute director Arbatov similarly warned in the 22 July PRAVDA that "power itself does not guarantee peace and much less detente."

Kosygin, in Austria on 4 July, also acknowledged that the June summit was a search for "major and reliable solutions" to the problem of international security that would "liberate vast material resources for useful and creative aims." Other spokesmen have asserted that SALT in particular should lead to a shift in budget priorities. M. O. Kolosov, in a 29 July PRAVDA article on the

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strategic implications of the summit, said that the agreement on SALT reached by the two leaders gave "considerable momentum" to the negotiators' search for an agreement that would permit the Soviet Union and the United States to "redirect more funds to creative needs and to the improvement of people's lives."

Soviet impatience over realizing the practical results of the detente policy was intimated by Arbatov in a Budapest TV interview on 5 August. Responding to remarks by the interviewer about Hungarian concern over the tangible economic benefits of improved East-West relations, Arbatov noted that "this impatience is characteristic not only of Hungarians. Other people ask the same thing." He went on to cite the savings already realized from SALT through its agreement limiting ABM deployment.*

DIMINISHED THREAT As if to lend support to its own hopes for a peace dividend, Moscow has in recent weeks projected confidence regarding the intentions of Western leaders and the military threat posed by its Western adversaries. TASS on 5 August singled out French parliamentary leader Edgar Faure's remark that he had returned from his recent Moscow trip convinced that "at present neither the capitalist system nor the communist system seeks victory through force."

The image of the United States has also benefited from this new mood. Arbatov, in a radio interview broadcast to North America on 18 July, observed that U.S. policy today "is shaped not by the opponents of detente but by those who have the interests of peace and goodneighborly relations at heart." IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin observed on 25 July that "a review of the strategic foundations of U.S. foreign policy was one of the prerequisites of the normalization of Soviet-American relations." Other commentators have recently professed to see signs that in the wake of Brezhnev's visit many U.S. political figures are reassessing the need for current levels of military spending. At the same time, Moscow has been soft-pedaling indications of disagreement with the United States on a wide range of nuclear and arms control issues, from force reductions in Europe to the negotiations of the disarmament committee in Geneva.

* Arbatov addressed another question in the interview that has been broached only indirectly in Soviet media. In response to a question about how much detente with the United States depends on "certain personalities," he granted that President Nixon has played an important role but argued that this change of attitude by a once "rigid anticommunist" was prompted by objective, long-term factors.

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BACKGROUND Brezhnev in two 1971 speeches touched on the relationship between SALT, defense spending, and the rate of economic growth. In an RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech in June 1971 he acknowledged that "without large defense expenditures we and our economy would move ahead far more quickly." Three months earlier, at the 24th CPSU Congress, he had asserted that a successful outcome of SALT would free "considerable means" for "constructive goals."

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CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY DEMANDS BETTER TREATMENT OF RUSTICATED YOUTH

The regime has indicated in exceptionally sharp terms that it is keenly disappointed with the implementation of the rustication program and that it is intent on insuring more effective leadership down to the grassroots level. While disclosing frankly the ills besetting youth sent to the countryside, Peking has also made clear that the intensified rustication program--which some may have thought a temporary measure to dampen youthful activism promoted by the cultural revolution--is a permanent program designed to aid in coping with one of the regime's most pressing problem areas, agricultural production.

These concerns have been given authoritative expression in a 7 August PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial entitled "Improve Work Regarding Educated Young People Going to the Countryside." In view of the sensitive issues raised and the candor of the language, it is noteworthy that NCNA's international service disseminated the text of the editorial as well as a shorter version. Buttressing this summer's call for party bodies to improve their work regarding youth assigned to the countryside, the editorial decries "unhealthy tendencies" and enjoins cadres with a "poor understanding" of the program to "straighten themselves out quickly." The editorial puts teeth into its injunction by threatening "class enemies and criminals who oppress and persecute educated young people" with "heavy blows and punishment according to law."

The economic interests served by rustication are reflected in the editorial's stress on the importance of agriculture and on the need for "a great number" of educated youth to contribute their skills to the rural economy. Having posited this need, the editorial proceeds to outline directives for improving the youth's living conditions in order to strike "a proper balance between work and leisure." A similar concern over the well-being of rusticated youth was reflected in a 27 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editor's note holding up the experience of one production team as exemplary for having enabled the youth to be self-supporting. Invoking Mao's concern over the living conditions of rusticated youth, the editor's note called on cadres to take effective measures to increase the income of youth.

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A PEOPLE'S DAILY article on 3 July suggested that the campaign to achieve effective leadership over rusticated youth is well underway, stating that Changchun municipality had met the problem of rural cadre unable to cope with the educated youths by sending 500 cadres noted for their "high standards" along with the students as supervisors. According to the article, these cadres "were later incorporated into the leading bodies of the counties and communes concerned to keep in close contact with the educated young people to look after their thinking, studying, living, and laboring conditions."

Though the editorial urges that conditions be created for the rusticated youth to "learn culture, science and technology," there is no reference to another aspect of youth policy now under discussion, the issue of college enrollment. It might be assumed that improvement of their living conditions, including provisions for more leisure and time for study, would enhance the likelihood that youth sent to the countryside could pass the college entrance examination. The issue being raised in regard to college enrollment policy, however, is the degree to which the system should be weighted toward substantive academic criteria, and the editorial simply avoids the subject. That issue has been posed most sharply by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien's provincial base, Liaoning, which opened the discussion by venting the frustrations of a rusticated youth unable to cope with the college entrance examination because of too much time devoted to work at the expense of substantive academic study.

Whatever its possible implications for educational policy, the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial develops a line on youth consistent with the moderate policies adopted in recent years and thus consistent with the liberalizing trends associated with Chou En-lai. In addition to the tough admonition against "persecution" of educated youth, the editorial is strikingly solicitous toward their "opinions and demands" and even insists that their "special characteristics" must be taken into consideration.

PEKING DROPS MAO HONORIFIC IN FURTHER REDUCTION OF CULT

In a notable move toward further scaling down the Mao cult since the cultural revolution, Peking's account of Mao's meeting on 2 August with two Chinese-American doctors referred to Mao as "the leader of the Chinese people" instead of the standard "great leader of the Chinese people." Identical reports on the meeting were carried by NCNA's English service, the NCNA domestic

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service, Peking's domestic radio, and Peking's domestic radiophoto service. Mao was called "great leader" as recently as 31 July when Yeh Chien-ying used that formula in a toast delivered at the reception in Peking marking the PLA anniversary.

Moves to dismantle the trappings of the Mao cult have been associated with the campaign to discredit former heir-apparent Lin Biao since Lin's downfall in September 1971. One of the charges in this campaign has been that he fostered a theory of "geniuses" guiding historical development and that he promoted the Mao cult for his own purposes in order to exclude the role of the "masses"--meaning the party in particular. A major joint editorial published on 1 December 1971 seemed to have subordinated Mao to the party in referring to the CCP with "Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its leader," but that formulation did not become standard.

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INDOCHINA

PEKING OFFERS RESTRAINED SUPPORT FOR ALLIES' PRONOUNCEMENTS

Peking responded with careful restraint to the 30 July PRG and 31 July DRV foreign ministry statements on implementation of the 13 June joint communique, duly criticizing alleged violations by the Saigon administration while softpedaling charges against the United States. Following past practice, Peking did not respond to its allies' statements at an equivalent level, in this case seconding the foreign ministry statements with a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, the lowest level of authoritative Chinese comment. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on 3 April had seconded government-level statements on implementation of the peace agreement issued by the DRV (30 March) and the PRG (1 April).

Like the 3 April editorial, the Commentator article avoided direct reference to specific deadlines for fulfillment of provisions of the peace accord, reviewing implementation in general terms now that "over 40 days have elapsed" since the signing of the joint communique. While noting that some provisions had been fulfilled, it asserted that because of "obstruction and sabotage" by Saigon and the United States, peace in Vietnam was still unstable and important provisions remained to be implemented. It added merely that this "cannot but arouse concern" of people throughout the world. Last April's editorial, in a similar passage charging Saigon-U.S. obstruction, had commented in a sharper tone that such violations would meet with "strong condemnation" from the world's people.

After routinely citing the Vietnamese communists' "unremitting efforts" to abide by the peace agreement, the Commentator article focused on alleged Saigon violations of the cease-fire, delay in returning civilian prisoners, and impediments to the formation of a national council. In contrast, the United States came in for only brief criticism on the grounds that it has not strictly carried out unspecified commitments and "allows" Saigon to violate the agreement. Commentator thus watered down the charges in the 3 April editorial, which accused the United States of having "supported" the Saigon violations and went on to denounce specific U.S. actions ranging from the delay in the removal of mines to the bombing of Cambodia. Though the recent Vietnamese statements once again charged U.S. infractions in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Vietnam, the Commentator article strictly limited its observations to Vietnam.

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Characteristically, Peking sidestepped criticism of U.S. intentions while accusing Saigon of not wanting a stable peace and of having no intention of supporting genuine self-determination. Only Saigon was accused of "acting perfidiously" and not keeping its word. The Vietnamese statements, in contrast, had cited the "Nixon Doctrine" in taking critical note of Washington's alleged intention to maintain U.S. "neocolonialism" in the area. Though NCNA duly carried the texts of the official Vietnamese statements, its replays of lower-level comment, including a 1 August NHAN DAN editorial on the agreement, deleted all references to U.S. intentions and to the Administration by name. NCNA also omitted the editorial's reference to continued U.S. aid for Vientiane and Phnom Penh as well as U.S. use of air bases in Thailand.

Cautiously stating Peking's position on the Vietnam question, the Commentator article said the Chinese "resolutely support" the Vietnamese people's "just struggle and righteous demands," and it called on both the United States and Saigon to implement the Paris agreement and the joint communique. Commentator directed specific demands only to Saigon, however.

DRV SCORES NIXON LETTER, U.S. POLICIES ON MINE REMOVAL, AID

Hanoi comment reflects DRV dissatisfaction with U.S. implementation of its obligations under the peace agreement and the 13 June joint communique, but the United States is still treated with circumspection. A NHAN DAN editorial assailed President Nixon's 3 August letter to Congress on the 15 August deadline for a halt to U.S. bombing in Indochina. But it responded only indirectly to his warning that a DRV offensive would prompt appropriate U.S. action. The editorial, on the 5th, did not quote the letter on this point; instead, it vaguely accused the Administration of "casting blame on the DRV and making threats against us." It went on to assert that the Vietnamese are resolved to reject and condemn the U.S. allegations and to "smash and punish all acts of aggression and intervention by the U.S. imperialists against our fatherland."

Continuing Hanoi charges that the United States is failing to live up to its obligations under the peace agreements were voiced authoritatively in a 6 August statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman, responding to statements by U.S. officials on the clearing of mines from DRV waters and the U.S.-DRV economic consultations.

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MINE CLEARING Echoing earlier news reports, the spokesman rejected the 3 August statement by Rear Admiral McCauley that the DRV had ~~hindered~~ minesweeping efforts. It also reiterated the charge, first leveled in the 31 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement, that the United States has failed to meet its obligations because it has not "removed" deactivated mines nor provided necessary means for sweeping mines on inland waterways. The U.S. obligation to provide "adequate and sufficient" means for sweeping DRV rivers was reaffirmed in the 13 June joint communique and Hanoi does not now indicate the nature of the stumbling block in implementing this provision. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman in a press conference on 1 March had complained that the United States had offered equipment to sweep the rivers but had withheld necessary means to transport the equipment.

In raising the demand for the mines to be removed, Hanoi appears to be pressing a more controversial issue which has rarely been spelled out. The statement by the foreign ministry spokesman at his 1 March press conference was unusually specific in assailing the United States for failing to supply the means to "remove" mines and to survey remaining mines. The Paris agreement stated that the United States would "remove, permanently deactivate or destroy" mines in DRV territorial waters; and its protocol on the mines specified that "on the request" of the DRV, mines shall be "removed or destroyed" and that when their removal or destruction is impossible they shall be "permanently deactivated and their emplacement clearly marked." The 13 June communique was much less specific, merely committing the United States to mine "clearance." Since the signing of the 13 June communique, the question of mine removal was raised in a 2 July Hanoi broadcast which defined the communique's reference to mine-clearing operations to include "mine removal."

U.S. AID The 6 August spokesman's statement also scored remarks by a State Department spokesman on the 3d that the United States would provide no reconstruction assistance to the DRV until Hanoi fully observed the cease-fire in Indochina and Congress appropriated the money. While attacking the United States for seeking to procrastinate and set preconditions for its assistance, the DRV spokesman was not as forthright as a 5 August NHAN DAN commentary which asserted that the United States "may not pose preconditions" for assistance or link it to "the situation elsewhere."

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The spokesman's statement repeated the contention of the 31 July Foreign ministry statement that the U.S.-DRV economic commission had already agreed on aid. In addition, the spokesman echoed the specific assertion, first voiced by Le Duc Tho in a 2 August television interview, that the economic commission had reached agreement on the sum of money and its utilization in the DRV five-year program, as well as agreement on the first-year program under which the United States will contribute to DRV reconstruction. (Tho's television interview, carried by Hanoi radio and VNA, was his first public statement since he returned to Hanoi on 25 June after signing the 13 June joint communique in Paris. He has appeared only once in the intervening period--at the 8 July ceremony on the departure of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong to the Soviet Union.)

HANOI CALLS FOR COMMUNIST UNITY, WARNS OF DANGER FROM U.S.

Hanoi's concern over divisions in the communist world and their effect on Vietnam was voiced anew in an interview given by Politburo member Truong Chinh to visiting Indian correspondents, released by Hanoi media on 2 August. Describing U.S. strategy since the peace settlement, Truong Chinh repeated Hanoi's contention that the Nixon Administration pursues diplomatic activities "aimed at dividing revolutionary forces in the world." This charge, associated with North Vietnamese disquiet over moves by Moscow and Peking toward detente with the United States, had not been raised in Hanoi media in the past four months, since it appeared in the party paper NHAN DAN in a 7 April editorial and a 7 April Commentator article.* In response to a question about the prospect for relations among communist countries, Truong Chinh struck a positive note, claiming that communist "differences and dissensions are only temporary" while unity and cohesion "are permanent and necessary." He went on to predict that "the day will come when the socialist countries are more closely and fully united" and that then the socialist system will more forcefully play its role as the "determining factor in the development of human society."

The Truong Chinh interview came in the wake of speeches by Pham Van Dong in Eastern Europe which, for the first time in a year,

* The editorial and Commentator article are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 April 1973, pages 6-7.

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reaffirmed Hanoi's intention to endeavor to "restore" communist unity--a commitment echoed by Truong Chinh.* The importance of communist unity was also stressed in a 30 July NHAN DAN editorial which, without harsh polemicizing, in effect offered a rejoinder to Soviet policies of detente. The editorial, marking the 70th anniversary of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, reiterated Hanoi's position that "the most dangerous common enemy of the revolutionary forces and world's people" is the "imperialist forces headed by U.S. imperialism." NHAN DAN also pointed out the historical significance of understanding "the nature of imperialism in all its schemes and its tricks to change its form." Touting Vietnamese credentials in communist relations and theory, the editorial maintained: "Under all complicated circumstances, we have struggled unceasingly and positively to contribute to protecting the purity of Marxism-Leninism, protecting and strengthening the solidarity and unification among the brotherly countries and parties, and accelerating the struggle of toiling mankind and revolutionary movements against imperialism. . . ."

* Pham Van Dong's revival of the plea for the restoration of world communist unity is discussed in the TRENDS OF 25 July 1973, pages 5-6.

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NOTES

WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL: Reflecting the climate of East-West détente, the 10th World Youth Festival, held in East Berlin from 28 July to 5 August and attended by some 25,000 guests from 140 countries, encountered no serious disruption and ended with an "appeal" which refrained from naming the United States in its attacks on "imperialism." By contrast, the 9th festival held in Sofia in the summer of 1968 had been wracked by controversy over the developing Czechoslovak crisis. At the start of this year's festival, GDR media predictably alleged that West German youth groups planned to disrupt the affair and subsequently complained about "distorted" reports on the festival in the West German press. The absence of a PRC youth delegation was decried in a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin on 25 July and similar complaints appeared in the GDR and Hungarian press. On the death of Walter Ulbricht on 1 August, the GDR regime promptly announced the deceased leader's last wish for the "successful completion" of the festival and delayed the funeral ceremony until the 7th--well after the close of the festival.

SOVIET FAMILY SUBSIDIES: In the July issue of OUR CONTEMPORARY the foremost Soviet demographer Viktor Perevedentsev has proposed readjusting wage scales to encourage larger families. Arguing that the present low birthrate requires "sharp activization of demographic policy," he urged subsidies for each child to counteract the present trend. Noting that the "main objection" to such subsidies would be the cost to the state, he explained that the money could be raised from the wage fund by diverting funds for future wage increases to subsidies for larger families. Perevedentsev claimed that his proposal would eliminate the need for the current tax on unmarried persons and childless families and would be preferable to restoring the ban on abortion. Perevedentsev's proposals are consistent with other recent measures, such as the enactment of subsidies for children in low-income families, to meet the urgent manpower needs of the economy.

PRC ARMY DAY: Peking's coverage of receptions abroad marking the 1 August anniversary of the PLA was consistent with the low-key observance of the event at home this year (see the TRENDS of 1 August, page 1). NCNA failed this year to replay comment on the occasion from friendly countries and markedly scaled down its coverage of receptions in Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

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At the same time, Peking's treatment of the event reflected its effort to isolate the Soviet Union as the principal enemy. The JRC embassy's reception in Moscow was the only one not accorded the characterization "friendly" or better in NCNA's reports of Army Day receptions in various countries. Last year Moscow shared this slight with New Delhi and Vientiane, but the receptions in the latter two cities this year were called "friendly."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 30 JULY - 5 AUGUST 1973

<u>Moscow (2434 items)</u>		<u>Peking (1073 items)</u>	
Crimea Meeting of Soviet Bloc Party Leaders	(--)	Domestic Issues	(48%) 51%
10th World Youth Festival, Berlin	(9%) 9%	[PLA 46th Anniversary	(--)
Supreme Soviet Session, 30-31 July	(--)	Congo President Ngouabi in PRC, DPRK	(9%) 14%
[Podgornyy Speech	(--)	Vietnam	(4%) 7%
China	4%	Cambodia	(12%) 4%
Award to Ukrainian SSR	(9%) 4%	Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in U.S.	(--)
Indochina	(2%) 2%	UNCTAD Meeting	(--)

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.